Crisis may spread through economy via the propagating mechanisms of the labour market -households becoming delinquent due to an initial unemployment shock may be unable to continue servicing obligations versus the financial system. With large debts -e.g. mortgages -such defaults pose a threat to financial system stability. In this paper we use the Polish household budget surveys to simulate the impact of changes in the labour market status of household members on the ability of the household to service its mortgage payments. The simulation results are subsequently aggregated to facilitate a macro-level interpretation of the findings. We simulate various scenarios of labour market deterioration. Finally, we also introduce in the simulations a policy instrument providing, in a fiscally neutral manner, additional stability to the financial system. Based on robustness checks, the findings seem to be reliable. The results suggest that even with shares of debtors among consumers as low as in Poland, the propagation mechanism may indeed result in considerable threat, while the fiscally neutral instrument is effective and well-suited to addressed in providing additional, stability to the financial system.
Introduction
In most theoretical approaches, credit worthiness is evaluated based on one's likelihood to service the future burden of repayments. The future liquidity position of debtors remains unknown at the time of credit approval, which is the core of risk associated with the approval decision. For mortgages, it has been frequently argued in the literature that scoring models can help to partly alleviate this problem by allocating potential clients a different probability of becoming delinquent over the credit horizon. Scoring models rely on proxies (e.g. demographic status, educational attainment) to forecast future labour market prospects (Wagner 2004) . Consequently, these models evaluate future earnings using a Heckman corrected Mincerian approach. However, such models may prove unreliable in the context of large swings in the unemployment rate, since such periods are typically associated with out-of-equilibrium labour market behaviour. Such swings are frequent in the context of developing or transition countries, but occur also in highly industrialised countries (e.g. Finland in mid 1990s or Ireland and Spain over the 2007-2009 period) .
It is believed that the current global financial crisis, emerging from the so called US sub-prime breakdown, is a result of lax lending standards on the part of financial institutions. However, most central banks in the world perform regular stress-testing on consumer lending to verify the vulnerability of the financial system to a sudden drop in debt servicing. Adversely changing labour market conditions may significantly affect debtors' ability to repay loans, while mortgages are characteristic in the sense, that the ratio of instalment to the total outstanding debt is the highest among credit products. Consequently, deterioration of the labour market situation may be strongly propagated to the financial system via the mortgage sector. What is the risk of observing a crisis similar to the sub-prime breakdown in the US as a consequence of the deterioration in the labour market? How large can the accumulated effect of the labour market propagation mechanisms be?
We address these questions by developing a simulation framework at the household level. The majority of the stress tests use macro-level relationships to evaluate micro-level effects. Thus, they predominantly rely on the behavioural relationships between macroeconomic aggregates. We take the alternative approach, deriving the macro-level implications from analysing micro-level behavioural patterns. We use two household-level datasets (Polish annual household budget surveys for 2007 and 2008) to simulate future employment prospects of income earners in these households using adapted labour force survey data (quarterly surveys for [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . The methodology captures individual heterogeneity, since individually observed labour market outlooks used for simulation take factors such as education and gender into account. We observe the changes in the liquidity of households as a result of their changing labour market status. We subsequently aggregate these findings to derive the macro-level implications.
Our findings suggest that changes in employment prospects will noticeably affect the ability of Polish households to service mortgage payments. The impact -which depends on the scenario -may even result in an increase by 3.4% in the stock of outstanding unserviced mortgage. We also introduce a fiscally neutral instrument which supports households' debt servicing ability. The performance of the instrument is surprisingly high, since it reduces the overall aggregated effect on the financial system by roughly 40%, equivalent to 1.4% of outstanding mortgages.
The paper is structured as follows. In section (2), we briefly present a review of the literature. Section (3) discusses the situation in order to justify the stylised facts used for the simulation. In section (4), we describe the data. Subsequently, we present the model setup in section (5). Section (6) presents the results and implications for policy.
Literature review
Even prior to the global financial crisis central banks have recognised the threat to the stability of the financial systems posed by delinquency of households burdened with debts. Typically, this question has been approached through stress-tests, applied to both consumer and commercial loans. These approaches have become increasingly sophisticated and used micro-level data, but the shock imposed in the stress tests is usually exogenous and by the very construct of the stress-tests cannot lead to propagation effects. To enrich this set up, central banks (including the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada and the Bank of Greece) have endeavoured to use household level data to approximate the distribution of the debt servicing burden; (Barwell, Orla and Pezzini 2006) ; (Simigiannis and Tzamourani 2006) ; (Faraqui 2006) . However, these approaches are backward looking in the sense that they analyse historical indicators, while the projections are based on structural relationships between macro-level aggregates.
For Poland, Zajaczkowski and Zochowski (2007) used household budget survey data to perform stresstests for monetary and foreign currency shocks, while Osinski, Szpunar and Tymoczko (eds.) (2008) report the results of simulations involving an increased risk of becoming unemployed (the unemployment rate was simulated to rise by 4.7 percentage points, which is a conservative, "pessimistic" projection). Both these studies show that Polish households' liquidity is vulnerable to exogenous shocks, but conclude that the stability of the financial system should remain unaffected.
The methodological problem with such analysis stems from the fact that two key variables on both "sides" of the equation are unobservable. Namely, neither the liquidity of the household, nor the minimum level of consumption that a household is "comfortable with" can be known. Consequently, they cannot reliably be projected into the future. There have been varied attempts to deal with this problem. Johansson and Persson (2006) , using Swedish data and developing the so-called margin approach, try to capture the effect of debts on the household liquidity. Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2009) develop measures of household's financial sophistication to explain a set of three investment mistakes: under diversification, risky share inertia, and the disposition effect. Similarly, Herrala and Kauko (2007) deliver an approach to capture the household distress by formulating an operational logit estimation valid under realistic assumptions about the "minimum satisfactory" costs of living. Both these approaches, however, focus on estimating "a" parameter. Consequently, macroeconomic effects are obtained conditionally on (i) homogeneity and susceptibility to outliers and (ii) no change in the underlying fundamentals.
We follow an alternative approach. Adequately addressing heterogeneity is crucial to obtaining reliable results since debtor households are indeed different from general labour force. To this end, we explore the individual heterogeneity hidden in the household budget survey data. In the simulations each householdeach household member -is subjected to an external stochastic process describing his/her labour market status. Household income is computed based on individual earned incomes 1 for the household members. Delinquency of a household eventually occurs if the earnings of all members do not cover the mortgage instalments and minimum social expenses. These household-level liquidity outcomes are then aggregated to summarise the risk to the financial system. Typically, households with mortgages are characterised by higher activity and lower unemployment rates than demographically comparable households a without mortgage, Blochlinger and Leippold (2006) . While being employed is typically a precondition for credit approval, this state of affairs may not necessarily persist throughout the entire period during which the mortgage has to be serviced. Firstly, labour market conditions may worsen in general, for both households with and without debt (e.g. a large negative output shock could lead to a large increase in unemployment). Alternatively, debtors may have similar long-term employment prospects as other labour market participants. Over time this circumstance would equalise their employment and activity rates with these of the rest of the population during the credit servicing period. Consequently, two scenarios are likely: (i) households with mortgages gradually becoming like their demographically comparable group in terms of employment performance; and (ii) recognising the fact that debtor households members may exert potentially higher effort in maintaining labour market status, (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994) , the effects of a general deterioration in the employment outlooks may in fact result in employment rates still continuously higher than peers but lower than when most credit contracts were signed.
We contribute to the literature in three main ways. First, we apply a multi-agent systems approach (MAS) using micro-level data to arrive at macroeconomic estimates of financial system stability. Secondly, we combine household level data on income and expenses with individual data on labour market status in order to adequately deal with the uncertain future employment prospects. Using current status in the labour market as a benchmark, we perform simulations using stylised facts about labour market evolutions. We use labour force survey data to obtain the probabilities of individuals changing labour market status, while we resort to propensity score matching techniques to provide an adequate benchmark for the changes among debtors in relation to the general population. Finally, we design and implement an instrument targeted to address the leverage effect. Contemporaneously unserviced instalments are small compared to the overall effect for the financial system (financial institutions need to write off the entire outstanding mortgage). The fiscally neutral instrument supports the households' liquidity for a fixed duration, which permits an evaluation of the size of its potential stabilisation effects.
Stylised facts
Taking a look at the Polish mortgage market, there are some immediate conclusions. Firstly, while the indebtedness of Polish households is still low by OECD standards, credit expansion over recent years has been spectacular. At the same time, it seems that the low rates of problem loans reported by the banks to the supervising authority are more of a statistical artefact associated with a rapidly increasing volume (denominator) than confirmation that the client base is inherently more reliable. It is useful to note that, as a general rule, Polish banks do not apply scoring models to evaluate debtors' future ability to service debts, neither do they control for past income experience, (Osinski et al. 2008) . Since mortgages are a relatively new instrument -present only for the past 15 years and booming since 2007 -financial institutions have little experience in evaluating the risks associated with worsening employment prospects for the debtors. Typical mortgage offers require future debtors to have full-time employment contracts of unlimited duration and offered up to 110% of the real estate value 2 . Consequently, Polish banks have little previous experience in evaluating the reliability of credit applicants. Nor is there a history of established mortgage contracts regularly serviced over the past 10-15 years, which could help manage adequately the risk of the portfolio as a whole.
On the other hand, the mortgages offered in Poland are subject to thorough regulation common for all EU countries. In addition, over time, constraints were imposed, forcing banks to evaluate creditworthiness using the same information, regardless of the credit conditions or the currency of denomination. However, although these regulations might have lowered the risk of borrowers abusing currency and interest rate arbitrage opportunities, they are not able to counteract the effect of market forces. For example, the vast majority of loans are characterised by a floating interest rate benchmark (WIBOR or LIBOR), while additional source of risk is introduced by exchange rates since approximately 70% of mortgages are denominated in foreign currency (Swiss franc, euro and yen). A large increase in the debt servicing burden could easily result from a depreciation of the Polish zloty and/or an increase in LIBOR 3 . In fact, the second half of 2008 was associated with currency depreciation of nearly 50% if compared to the period when majority of mortgage contracts was signed (middle of 2007).
Naturally, debtors differ from the population at large in terms of their labour market situation. When the general unemployment rate amounted to roughly 9% in the economy, based on the household survey only almost 3% of members of debtors households reported being unemployed. Also, when the overall activity rate was roughly 54%, among debtors it was only 37%. Also, since household budget survey is annual, it is rather difficult to analyse labour market changes based on this source. However, labour force survey (LFS) provides extensive knowledge in this respect, demonstrating consistent upward trend in inactivity, downward trend in activity and unemployment rate doubling in the period of 1995-2008, Figure 1 . Summarising, the recent years have forcefully shown that a transition economy like Poland is prone to large swings in the labour market outlook with the number of employed increasing by almost two million over a period of just two years. On the other hand, the labour market status of debtors differs considerably from what is observed in the economy in general. The reasons may include unobservable factors (e.g. higher search effort), but also differentiated socio-economic characteristics (e.g. higher educational attainment, residence in metropoly). To adequately introduce this element into the simulations, we have adopted the following strategy. First of all, to account for structural differences between the debtors and the general working population, we develop an analytical strategy to find the "corresponding" employment outlooks. Practically, we implement the propensity score matching technique to find within the labour force the "statistical twins" for the debtors. Consequently, we establish the unemployment rates for these who are similar to debtors.
Secondly, we allow two lines in the simulations. The first assumes that creditors consistently experience significantly better employment prospects due, for example, to higher search effort. Therefore, their probability of losing and finding jobs will evolve together with market conditions, but starting from the significantly higher levels of employment persistence (the likelihood of remaining in employment) and find rates (the likelihood of finding new employment). The alternative approach assumes that the change in the labour market prospects of debtors does not follow from an exogenous adverse shock, but instead focus on the endogenous changes in the labour market experience of debtors. The intuition behind this approach may be summarised as following: if the debtors are not inherently different from the general working population, with time their labour market status should become similar to their peers. That is, the simulated shock takes the form of the probabilities of flows into and out of employment of debtors gradually converging on those of their comparable demographic groups. Therefore, in the second approach we provide an analysis of the effects of continuing with the current, relatively bold labour market conditions if one no longer subscribes to the view that debtors are inherently different from the comparable non-debtors in the population in terms of employment prospects. Table 2 summarises the key concepts used the paper. 
Data
Polish household budget survey data show that, at the end of 2007, 3.6% of households included mortgage repayments in their monthly expenses. If one takes the aggregate data from financial system reports, with an additional assumption of approximately one debt per household, approximately 7.6% households should report mortgage repayments. Consequently, it seems that approximately half of all mortgages are missing from the household survey data. However, survey data are chosen to be representative of location and size of household, while housing loans tend to cluster in large agglomerations and among certain demographic groups of households. The majority of debts appear in young households (under 35 years), with the median at exactly this age threshold. In addition, having a mortgage is inversely correlated with age, with younger debtors burdened with more debt. Similar discrepancies are found in household budget surveys for other countries, e.g. Herrala and Kauko (2007) report it for Finland, Faraqui (2006) for Canada and Simigiannis and Tzamourani (2006) for Greece. A typical solution adopted in other countries is to re-weight the population of debtors to arrive at representative shares (e.g. Canada and Greece). Although technically feasible, such step is not necessary in our study, since the simulations are performed for the individuals present in the sample, regardless of their weight.
This assertion is further corroborated if the average size of debt is compared. Based on the reported value of monthly mortgage instalments we have computed the approximate size of debt in order to compare the result obtained with the general data on mortgage market. Household budget survey data suggest an average debt size of approximately PLN 100, 000 which is consistent with the aggregate reports from the financial institutions. Therefore the observed discrepancy does not undermine the reliability of the data. Also, it is evident that debtor households differ from the general population, (see Table 3 ).
Using household survey for 2007 and 2008, we have identified respectively 1 321 and 1 681 households who report mortgage repayments out of the approximately 37, 000 taking part in each of the the surveys. These households are populated by 2, 177 (in 2007) and 2, 818 (in 2008) working individuals, as well as 69 (84) unemployed and 887 (1, 070) inactive. For the purpose of the simulations, we keep the 887 / 1, 070 inactive individuals constant throughout the analysis and simulate the change in labour market status only among the employed and unemployed. The rationale behind this choice follows from the characteristics of the inactive population: these are predominantly elderly (receiving pension) or children (without income). In the case of the elderly, pension income is accounted for in the model since these revenues are treated as autonomous household income. Because there are very few households with more than two income earning individuals, we treat these incomes as autonomous and independent of the labour market status. Thus, it is not simulated 4 . In the case of children, the horizon of simulation (only 12 quarters) does not permit us to observe any serious changes in the household labour supply.
When using household level data one typically faces great difficulty with frequent underreporting of wage income and/or other incomes. Based on national accounts data, one could consider rescaling reported household incomes by a certain average ratio that corresponds to the differential observed between households' survey reporting and data recovered from the national accounts. However, these scaling factors differ significantly depending on the type of income ranging from 1.26 for pension income to as much as 4.74 for the self-employed. They are average results, while there are no grounds to presume that debtor households are typical of the whole of population in as far as income disclosure behavioural patterns are concerned. In fact, one could make an argument both ways: burdened with debt they are more aware of their actual financial situation (if underreporting was due to lack of adequate knowledge), but may also find it more rewarding to hide revenues (e.g. if they are already unable to service all obligations, including phone and electricity bills, other loans, etc.).
Thus, reliability of household delinquency rates derived from declared income may be significantly undermined if the values of income are not trustworthy. To address adequately the problem of potential underreporting, we use the current status as a benchmark and provide values for the estimated risk to the 
Liquidity concerns of the households
The basic variable of interest in this study is the liquidity of the households, i.e. the funds at the disposal of the household after subtracting consumption expenditure as well as monthly instalments from the declared income of the household. Taking the values reported in the two waves of the household budget surveys, one may be surprised to observe that on average roughly 17-18% of the households could not service mortgage in both 2007 and 2008. For young households (where the head of household is under 35 years of age), this number is higher then 22%, which implies that more than one out of each five debts allocated in recent years is not being serviced. This number is strikingly high, especially if one confronts it with the relatively low default ratio observed in the economy. The reasons for this situation may be twofold: households severely underreporting revenues or alternative financing strategies.
If the latter was true, a negative shock to the labour market remains equally relevant. Alternative strategies are essentially equivalent to other family members (e.g. parents or siblings) actually contributing to servicing the mortgage. That would simply not be reported in the HBS, since it is a family and not a household financial strategy. In this case, this high number of delinquent households may be an adequate reflection of reality. Although we do not know what the sources of revenue within a family are, it seems reasonable to assume that at least part of it draws from earned income and thus may be affected by adverse movements in the labour market. However, we would be unable to adequately model this shock and thus its transmission. If the former was true, the credibility of the data would be strongly undermined -throughout the study we rely on the income gap to be an indicator of delinquency which would be biased if incomes are underreported. Thus, we delve more deeply into the reliability of household reported income among the debtor households. Figure 2 demonstrates the link between liquidity and threshold income declared by the households to be "barely sufficient" 5 . We present it for three groups of households: those declaring their financial situation good, average and bad. One observes that these two values -threshold sufficient income and the income gap -are closely correlated 6 . Thus, it seems that the income reported by households seems to be fairly consistent with the households' perception of their financial situation. Consequently, we take the stand that even if actual income is somewhat underreported by households, for households with debt, its level is, at the very least, consistent with the actual "gap" declared by the household. In addition to graphical presentation, we also compare the distributions of answers for the total sample and for debtors' households. That is, households are asked in the HBS to evaluate their liquidity situation. We clearly observe that households with mortgages enjoy a better situation than the average Polish household. However, if we ask households with a negative income gap, their difficulties are more profound than those of the average of the population and fairly consistent with the strikingly high number of delinquent households (17%-18% Table 4 ). In fact, debtor households declaring liquidity difficulties -answers from "no liquidity" to "some hardship" -amount to some 18.2% of the population.
Summarising, households' concerns with liquidity are consistent both with the direction and the magnitude of the financial situation disclosed in the survey. Thus, the household budget survey data seem a reliable source of information for this simulation study. In the next section, we describe the simulation setup.
Model
Consider for simplicity a one member household. His/her labour market status is a stochastic process with two possible states: E for employment and N for non-employment. Future status is randomly allocated between these two states, either by changing the status (flows from employment to non-employment as well as from non-employment to employment) or by maintaining it. Depending on status in time t − 1, the situation in time t is drawn from a distribution Ω E for transitions to employment given status at time t − 1 or Ω N for non-employment. That is, each individual faces a typical Bellman type function:
where standard notation applies, so ω t denotes wealth at time t, while c t corresponds to costs born over this period. π e,t denotes the probability of remaining in employment and π n,t denotes the probability of remaining in non-employment. Naturally, the transition rates are given by the compliments of these values, i.e. of 1 − π e,t and 1 − π n,t for losing and finding employment, respectively. We want to simulate this equation and compare the values obtained with the minimum expenses for the household augmented by the mortgage instalments reported by the household. In this way we obtain a measure of interest for further analysis, residual income. Negative values of residual incomes correspond to financial distress for the household, impairing its ability to service mortgage. Using the monthly instalment report, we may roughly evaluate the outstanding debt. When aggregated, the risk to the stability of the financial system may be obtained. However, to develop a coherent framework of interaction between a trajectory of labour market status and household liquidity, the following steps need to be completed: 1. obtaining individual-level data from household level data; 2. modelling the labour market transitions (keeping, loosing or finding job, in the last case also the compensation needs to be set);
3. modelling the household consumption decisions at each period;
4. obtaining a measure of what we have called household liquidity;
5. obtaining the aggregated results to assess the risk to the stability of the financial system.
In this section we describe and justify the approach taken towards each of these five steps. The section is summarised by the model setup description.
Getting from household level to individual level data
Household budget surveys are the only representative dataset conveying reliable estimates of households' mortgage servicing effort. Moreover, this source also contains consumption expenditures and self-reported incomes. Thus, it seems to be a relevant source for this type of analysis. There are some important methodological issues to be tackled, however. First, incomes are reported at household level. This implies that individual-level earnings need to be "discovered" from information about the forms of employment which is linked with the value of earnings. Typically, a household in our dataset has between 1 and 4 adult members, of whom each reports labour market status. On the other hand, households report sources of income by types, which comprise: wage, earned income from self-employment, pension and social assistance. By combining the information about the sources of income with the labour market status of the household members we are able to separate household income by household members 7 . Second, although there may be even as much as four adult members in a household, earnings capacity is usually determined by the two leading members. Since there are also elderly household members, receiving pension, effectively opportunities for labour market participation for more than two household members are rather constrained. Therefore, in the subsequent analysis the simulations of labour market status concern only two members. The incomes contributed by other members, irrespective of their source, are treated as autonomous and cannot be lost by the household during the analysis horizon. These two simplifying assumptions may easily be relaxed, but the proposed formulation has the advantage of protecting the simulated income of the household from rapid changes in financial status arising for reasons other then labour market participation.
Finally, we also assume that the number of individuals in the household does not change over the simulation horizon. Thus, we implicitly rule out the decisions about child bearing (thus as well, at least temporary withdrawal from the labour market), marriage with a non-member, etc. The rationale behind this assumption is the same as discussed above. Naturally, in the real world events like that are likely to occur, while individuals do not necessarily choose according to the economically rational criteria. Consequently, including such decisions would imply blurring the picture without providing more insights into the question at hand in this paper.
Labour market transitions
The transition probabilities are obtained from the empirical model suggested by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and developed recently by Shimer (2008) . For the purpose of clarity, we only have two states in the labour market: employment and non-employment. We confine labour market outcomes to employment and non-employment, because, from the perspective of any household's income, unemployment benefit and social assistance are comparable, while the key issue is the ability to earn income sufficient to service mortgage payments 8 . Consequently, implicitly any unemployment in our model is involuntary -any shock we impose is a consequence of changes in labour demand and not variability in household labour supply decisions.
In principle, flows between states should be described by two independent equations:
which can subsequently be solved for π Nt and π Et . Consequently, using labour force survey data one can establish these actual values for a chosen reference period. These are reported in Figure 3 . Unfortunately, in practice there is one important difficulty with deriving relevant empirical values for these parameters. As discussed earlier, debtor households are characterised by noticeably lower unemployment rates. They are more frequently employed and experience a lower risk of being unemployed or inactive. Imposing the values that characterise the whole population would imply too high a risk of job loss in the simulation. However, it would be difficult to justify any arbitrary adjustments in these transition rates.
To overcome this difficulty we have chosen the following empirical strategy. Having separated the individuals within households, we use the propensity score matching technique to obtain relevant labour market trajectories from the LFS data. In particular, we use demographic, educational and geographical characteristics to match members of debtor households obtained through household budgets survey with individuals from the labour force survey. For each point in time over the period analysed we obtain comparable unemployment, inactivity and employment rates, which provide reliable benchmark for simulations.
Propensity score matching is a relatively new technique. It is typically applied to estimate whether a particular treatment has an effect and the size of the effect (e.g. the effectiveness of labour market policies, pharmaceutical research and the profitability of particular marketing solutions or the effect of institutions on economic development)
9 . The critical element in propensity score matching lies in the conditional independence assumption. The results will only be reliable if the selection of the control group (the group that did not have the treatment) is based on observed characteristics and that all variables that influence the outcome are simultaneously observed. In the case of this study, the pool for matching (the size of the control group in relation to the size of the analysed group) is relatively large, so there is no need for sampling with replacement. We apply kernel estimates of propensity scores with nearest neighbour matching, following Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) 10 . Individuals from the household budget survey are matched to individuals from the labour force survey. We use age, gender, education and residence (both the region and the size of residence) as well as their interactions to establish a propensity score, i.e. the measure of similarity between HBS and LFS individuals. In this way we are able to recover the labour market situation of the "statistical twins" of the debtors. Although the set of variables is limited in this study, we believe that relying on these basic data should be sufficient for the propensity score matching approach to be stable and for the conditional independence assumption to hold. We verify this approach empirically by the use of t-tests, as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 11 . Post-matching sample characteristics are not different between debtors and "matched" individuals from the LFS. However, the propensity score procedure failed to match people with below vocational education among the debtors. In terms of other variables, the matching procedure exhibited more than satisfactory properties 12 The labour market trajectories over the period 1998-2003 are depicted in Figure 4 .
These results clearly demonstrate two facts. First, statistical twins to the debtors observe considerably lower unemployment rates throughout the entire period. Second, they too experience a worsening of employment prospects when the observed unemployment rate doubles over the period of 1999-2004. Consequently, even when employment prospects are good, the differential between the reported unemployment rate among the debtors and matched "statistical twins" may gradually disappear. On the other hand, there may still persist significant unobserved heterogeneity between debtors and "statistical twins", the employment prospects may worsen with time, which gives support to the assumption about potential exogenous factors adversely affecting the labour market outlooks.
Our model for transition probabilities adopts the specification used in Shimer (2008) with two states:
Figure 4: Labour force survey data matched with individuals recovered from household budgets survey data employment and unemployment 13 . In the next step these probabilities are numerically, iteratively adjusted to create a baseline scenario. The baseline scenario refers to a situation in which on average, after 500 runs of the simulations, the number of unemployed within each gender and educational group remains unchanged during 12 quarters. That helped us to a create matrix containing probabilities for each group and for each period. Taking into account the acyclical behaviour of the separation rate, Figure 3 , we calibrated that matrix iteratively changing the separation rates so that the number of unemployed after 12 quarters increased to the estimated level derived from historical data.
Household consumption decision
Consumption decisions by the household are not explicitly modeled in this simulation. Households are assumed to first service the mortgage. We allocate each household a consumption expenditure equivalent to a social minimum. This amount is set annually by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and comprises necessary expenses for housing, nutrition and clothing per household member. The value depends on the size of household (average per member value is lower in more numerous households). For 2007 and 2008, this amount for a one-member household was equivalent to roughly 80% of the net average wage in the enterprise sector.
In this paper, the key variable describing the situation of a household is the residual income. This value is obtained for each household by subtracting the mortgage monthly instalment and social minimum consumption expenditure from the household income. If residual revenue takes positive values, the household is not considered delinquent. Naturally, only households with negative residual income values pose a threat of vis-à-vis the suspension of mortgage servicing. In the simulations we analyse the number of these households as well as the amount by which the incomes fall short of the scheduled minimum expenses.
The income support instrument introduced in this paper has the following structure. Delinquent households may apply to obtain support if delinquency results from job loss. However, the support is only provided for a fixed duration, a maximum of 1 year. Moreover, the definition of the residual income adopted in the simulation imposes a quite specific interpretation of the nature of the instrument. Namely, households are considered delinquent if they cannot cover the social minimum consumption expenditure. On the other hand, the financial support provided by definition first helps to service the mortgage instalments. The key feature of the simulation is that technically households are not "allowed" to consume more than social minimum if the debt is not serviced. Naturally, in some cases the financial support may be -and in fact will be -insufficient. Notwithstanding, in our simulation, households have the liberty of spending more than the social minimum on consumption if and only if they are able to service the debt 14 .
Aggregation of the findings
Typically, aggregation requires that adequate weights to be applied. Debtors are already a specific subpopulation in the HBS, which would make reliable weighting additionally troublesome. Thus we followed the alternative strategy. Namely, HBS provides directly the information about mortgage servicing, although the actual magnitude of outstanding debt is only implied 15 . The simulation produces the value of household incomes. With the assumed value of household consumption, as discussed above, and the actual value of monthly instalments available from HBS, it is possible to compute the share of current obligations not being serviced,. Under the additional assumption of monotonicity between the value of instalment and the value of debt, this share should be identical to the share of outstanding unserviced mortgage.
Our model's assumptions seem to be confirmed by the fact that the average estimated debt from HBS and the average mortgage loan obtained from macro data, (Meluch and Wydra 2008) are similar. The calculation method based on the HBSs replicates the structure of outstanding mortgage and monthly instalments that are available from macro-level sources such as the Supervision of the Financial Supervision Commission. We need to note however, that we have relied on additional information i.e.: aggregated currency structure of debt, average maturity date and level of interest rates available at the macro-level to recover the data on actual debt. In fact, household budget surveys only contain information on the instalments and not the outstanding mortgage 16 .
Simulation setup
Household survey data suffer from many well known shortcomings, including underreporting. In fact, if the delinquency criterion is applied to raw data, as much as 17%-18% of households are not able to provide for minimum consumption and mortgage instalments. Practically, underreporting cannot be reliably addressed, while sometimes it may actually be a result of a survey structure (household instead of family reporting) and not conscious attempts to falsify the reported data. However, from an analytical point of view, this problem needs to adequately tackle in order to corroborate the simulation findings.
To this end, we also simulate also a "no change" scenario -individuals' labour market status may change, but the aggregate number of unemployed is roughly the same in each of the simulation periods. This baseline specification permits us to obtain a reliable benchmark for the simulations allowing for changes in the aggregate labour market outlooks, since all changes in the share of delinquency and aggregate threat to the financial sector may be compared not to -so to say -current status, but a statistically reliable counterfactual of the current status. For subsequent analyses we take the data at their face value and only observe the effects of changes in the π i,t parameters on households' liquidity and thus the aggregate threat to the financial sector.
The benchmark transition probabilities also play a role in the steady state in this analysis. Since these probabilities describe a situation in which over simulation flows into and out of employment for all income earners were comparable, analysed scenarios of labour market change are based on these initial values. Please note, that in this analysis under the initial calibration the number of households able to service debt may actually be affected despite random allocations of events corresponding to the current labour market status change. Thus, jobs may be lost in households with higher mortgage and resumed by individuals from households with lower debts.
Time line The simulations are run for three years, which implies that for each earning household member the transition probabilities are drawn twelve times. In each period, household members experience either change in their labour market status with randomised transition probabilities or stay in the same state with randomised persistence probabilities. Once the labour market status is set, individual incomes are known. The employed maintain their previous period income or -in the case of unemployed becoming employedreceive randomised income (with a distribution centred on either the last available income or, otherwise, the national average). Those becoming unemployed loose earned income. In the case of simulations with a policy instrument, we also allocate a benefit benchmarked to the actual value of social assistance and unemployment benefits. This benefit is given to agents for four consecutive quarters or until they resume employment (whichever is sooner). Finally, household total income is computed and the value of household residual income is found. If residual income is negative, households are labelled as delinquent.
Scenarios. The size of the labour market shock imposed in the simulations needs to be benchmarked to the labour market's characteristics. However, as depicted in Figure 4 , the debtor household members differ even from the "matched" individuals. This is naturally attributable to the fact, that one usually needs to be employed in order to obtain mortgage. To formulate the scenarios for simulation, we used the following rationale. First, debtors may eventually become similar to the "statistical twins" observed in the labour force survey. That would necessitate an increase in the unemployment rate from roughly 3% to as much as 7.2%. Such a scenario may indeed be a considered pessimistic -from the bottom to the top of the unemployment cycle over 1995-2008, the change in the national unemployment rate was roughly twofold, so less than here. This would be considerable shock, and thus not likely in reality.
The alternative would be to analyse the situation in which general labour market situation worsens according to the economic forecasts. That would imply an aggregate unemployment rate of roughly 12% at the end of the simulation period, while the corresponding rate among the "statistical twins" would be roughly 8.8%. That would imply an increase in 1.9 percentage points (approximately 28%) for the "twins" thus corresponding to a 3.8% unemployment rate among the debtors. In the reminder of the paper we refer to this scenario as optimistic, since the worsening of labour market outlooks is somewhat contained.
Finally, the unemployment rate could increase beyond projections. In that case, the historical maximum has been set at 21%, which implies an unemployment rate among the "matched" indviduals of 15% (more than doubling the initial rate). The proportional shift in labour demand would invoke a change of almost 6.1% among the debtors. This change is, perhaps surprisingly, smaller than in the pessimistic scenario and at the same time larger than in the optimistic scenario. Also, in reality both these effects are likely to interact: employment prospects worsening and debtors becoming more like the "statistical twins". Thus, we refer to this case as a realistic scenario. The summary of the simulation assumptions is presented in Figure ( Simulation procedure The simulation procedure is described by the following steps:
1. The labour market status of each individual at time t is determined; 2. A probability of change is randomly assigned to each individual; 3. The selected probability is compared to empirically derived thresholds (there are two separate distributions for E and N derived from labour market transitions discussed in the above sections, threshold probabilities differ between scenarios and have been calculated separately for different gender and education groups) (a) if a flow from E to N occurs (the individual loses employment), earnings of this individual are subtracted from household incomes;
(b) if a flow from N to E occurs, (the individual obtains employment), a randomly selected income is added to the household reported incomes (the distribution of income is recovered from the original data of debtor households);
(c) if the individual remains in either of the states, the financial situation of the household remains as in the previous period.
4. Subsequently, we subtract mortgage payment and subsistence living expenses relevant to the size of the household; 5. We compare this outcome to benchmark simulation (original data);
6. We compute the residual income at each point in time;
7. We continue with this procedure for 12 subsequent periods (equivalent to 3 years);
8. We repeat the procedure 500 times to assure statistical reliability.
Step 5 was necessary, because data for both 2007 and 2008 suggest that almost one in five households cannot service their mortgage (as discussed earlier). Therefore, in the simulations we use the current situation as benchmark. Simulations were conducted with and without the instrument (in the event of losing a job, the individual obtains a fixed duration benefit calibrated in value to the unemployment benefit or social assistance benefit). In simulations with instrument, if employment is not resumed, the support is maintained for four consecutive periods.
Results
This section reports the final results of the simulations, i.e. the results after 12 periods simulated 500 times. We take two perspectives to provide informative outcomes. First, we observe the distributions of residual income, noting the percentile of the distribution for which households become delinquent under the analysed scenarios. Second, we evaluate the severity of financial distress for the delinquent households along the distribution. Third, we evaluate the effectiveness of the policy instrument introduced in the analysis. Finally, we the use these results to provide estimates of the threat to the stability of the financial system depending on a particular scenario. All results are reported in two variants. In the simulations all individuals moving from employment to non-employment may obtain a benefit of 500 PLN (which is roughly equivalent to the unemployment and social assistance benefits in Poland). The rationale behind such definition of the instrument is the following. All adults with sufficient employment experience are entitled to an unemployment benefit: thus irrespectively of having a mortgage or not, debtors could access this additional source of financing. However, in calculating the residual income we implicitly assume that households only allocate the benefit to consumption if the mortgage is serviced. This technically follows from the fact that consumption expenditure is a constrained social minimum, as discussed earlier. Thus, in fact, mortgage servicing has a strict priority over consumption in our settings. Consequently, the "instrument" is not the actual income support, rather assistance to servicing the loans for the delinquent households 17 . In this definition, delinquency may occur only as an outcome of insufficient means and not because of "excessive" consumption 18 . In the real world, however, it is likely that households experiencing a worsening of their financial situation will be unable to smoothly constrain consumption. Therefore, we also consider a "no instrument" scenario, which proxies the case where households allocate unemployment benefit entirely to "excessive" consumption and thus fail to service mortgage instalments. Simulations seem robust. The 500 replications with different seeds did not produce large outliers in terms of the stability of the financial sector, which suggests that the specification of the shock was accepted by the data. We show the percentile of the residual income distribution for which residual income becomes negative, i.e. the share of households who can no longer service their mortgages as well as the statistical properties of the residual revenue distribution across simulations. The standard deviation is indeed small and the distribution is largely condensed around the mean values, which corroborates the reliability of the numbers reported in Table 6 . Details on the statistical resilience of the findings is reported in Table 5 . Table 6 reports the simulation results 19 . We report the data for the three analysed scenarios. However, as we already explained, each scenario may be simulated with or without the policy instrument. Moreover, in order to make the results immune to the potential reshuffling between the households during the simulations, the results are also compared to the dynamic benchmark 20 . Finally, we use two datasets -the surveys for 2007 and 2008. As to the variables we observed, we are interested in the share of endangered credits 21 . We observe both the levels and the changes between t = 0 and t = 12 in both the share and the sum of endangered credits. Moreover, we also observe the situation of the households. In order to compare the situation of households, we report the average ratio of residual income to the household income (it is only reported for the delinquent households). This ratio tells us how severe the situation of these households is. Finally, we can compare the scenarios with and without the policy instrument.
Results are robust to the sample under analysis. Simulation outcomes for 2007 and 2008 are fairly consistent. The input values for 2008 are slightly higher than for 2007, which implies also higher output values. Nonetheless, the changes maintain the same proportions and are monotonous across the scenarios. However, the changes are largest within the baseline scenario, which is inherent to this type of simulation.
17 Once the household is able to cover the monthly installments and the social minimum in terms of consumption -excessive funds available for consumption are not of interest in our simulation.
18 Such design of the instrument would correspond to a legal framework where the unemployment benefit is transferred directly to the repayment of the debt and only the eventual reminder was available for consumption 19 Please note that the initial delinquency data concern the share of loans by the value of endangered outstanding mortgage. The previously invoked number of 17%-18% delinquent household refers to the number of debtors and not the volume of debt. This small discrepancy follows from the fact that delinquent households are characterised by slightly smaller mortgages.
20 As discussed earlier, dynamic benchmark consists of simulation in which the average number of unemployed individuals does not change, but some individuals actually change their labour market status.
21 As we discussed earlier, the sum of endangered credits is derived from the share of endangered credits and the aggregate value of outstanding mortgages. Namely, even if the aggregate number of unemployed does not change, in fact compared to t = 0 the individual situation may only be worse due to the non-zero risk of losing employment even if it can be promptly resumed. If unemployment occurs in the one-person household, all income sources are lost. This is why in the analysis, the comparisons are with reference to the baseline scenario at t = 12 and not just at t = 0. The analysis demonstrates that the actual effects on financial system stability are large. Depending on whether the instrument is in place or not, the increase in potentially non-performing loans reaches as much as even 3-4% of total outstanding mortgage debt in comparison to the baseline simulation. If compared to t = 0 this number grows to 8%. Although these are the values for the pessimistic scenario, so a considerable labour market shock, in the realistic scenario the increase in endangered loans ranges between 1.4% and 2%. This is equivalent to a half of annual profits in the entire banking sector 22 . The realistic scenario numbers could also be compared to the annual increase in the stock of mortgages: the increase in unserviced mortgage would The effects of the instrument are promising. The fiscally neutral financial support instrument (the nature of the instrument, as argued earlier, lies in the allowed structure of consumption expenditure) yields roughly a 0.3 percentage point difference in terms of share of loans endangered if compared to the baseline simulation and over 1.1 percentage point when compared to t = 0 23 . This is a considerable reduction in the income gap. In fact, the residual revenue gap is reduced by as much as 3.0% to 4.6%. In monetary terms, the gain in financial system stability amounts to 1 bln PLN (in the pessimistic scenario) which is considerable if one considers that the instrument is fiscally neutral. Importantly, both the magnitude of the increased systemic risk to the financial sector and the effectiveness of the instrument follow from a relatively mild shock. However, the above calculations implicitly assume a continuum of the mortgage repayment process. In a sense, in our setup if a household can afford to service 50% of their loan, in our study only 50% of the outstanding credit is treated as unserviced. Thus, to verify the reliability of these findings, we have verified the (average) severity of the household delinquency. It may either be marginal as compared to the income at household disposal -or actually a considerable burden. We compute the ratio of residual income to monthly mortgage payments at deciles of the residual revenue distribution. We analyse negative values of residual income only. The results are reported in Table  7 . The median residual revenue gap amounts to roughly 30% of the instalment, which on the one hand is considerable but on the other suggests that the majority of the mortgage can actually be serviced by as much as 70% of the delinquent households (it is the 20th percentile for which the values circulate around -0.5 of the monthly instalment). This finding suggests that also for the banks there is room for renegotiating the mortgage conditions before radical steps become unavoidable. It also implies that a temporary reduction of the consumption below the social minimum may actually be a viable solution for some of the delinquent households.
Here too the behaviour of the instrument is promising. The reduction in the ratio as a consequence of the instrument is largest at the bottom of the distribution. Data demonstrates that both in 2007 and 2008 the average value of instalments at the bottom of the residual revenue distribution is lower, which suggests that the instrument will be particularly efficient in the case of poorer households with smaller mortgages. The reduction in the ratio may be as high as approximately 7%-17% in this group.
The devised instrument does not prevent the increased threat to stability of the financial system stability. The only source of its power emerges from the way consumption expenditure is allocated to households.
Since we compute residual income as income less mortgages less the imposed level of consumption, households were identified as delinquent as soon as they could not cover these basic expenses. The instrument -being regular income support to the unemployed -does not change this consumption rule, so the benefit "cannot" be spent on consumption if that would risk the servicing of the debt.
However, the methodology proposed above allows not only to show that such strict solutions work relatively well due to the leverage effects. We may also derive the magnitude of additional financial support the debtor households should receive in order to minimise the threat to the financial system. Such policy oriented analysis should also comprise other obligations of the households to the financial institutions, which were kept out of this analysis for the purpose of clarity.
7 Concluding remarks Gorton (2008) analyses in detail the origins of the recent financial distress in the US, describing how the banking system crisis emerged in the US from mortgage difficulties in the so-called sub-prime segment of the market. There seems to be a consensus in the literature that the sub-prime crisis stemmed from lax lending standards by the financial institutions. However, the important conclusion that emerges from this analysis for any economy concerns the nature of distress risk in the financial system. Labour market contraction may affect debtor households sufficiently severely to harm the individual capacity to service the debts. If the change in the labour demand is large enough, the number of households falling behind on the monthly mortgage instalments may indeed be large enough to pose a threat to the financial system stability.
Such a propagation mechanism -from labour markets to the financial system via the credit channel -is particularly exposed to distributional effects. Heterogeneity may be exhibited through: (i) alternatives to provide for monthly instalments without wage earned income; (ii) duration of the period when the debts can still be serviced without currently earned income; (iii) earned income level when employment is finally resumed. These distributional effects may interact adversely with the size of outstanding mortgage as well as recuperation options for the banks. Consequently, the propagation mechanism is likely to be reinforced at both microeconomic and macroeconomic level.
We use simulations in order to observe the impact of changing labour market conditions on household liquidity derived from three alternative scenarios. We repeat these simulations for with or without a fixed duration income support instrument for individuals losing employment. In both cases we find that even small changes in employment persistence can lead to a considerable deterioration in households' liquidity putting at risk financial sector stability. It should be highlighted that in the simulations we do not allow any intervention from the bank itself (e.g. selling of the property, renegotiating the monthly instalments, etc.). Naturally, observing a lower ability to repay, banks may cooperate with clients to design tailored solutions.
Our study finds that an increase in the unemployment rate by 2 percentage points in the economy may result in a increase in the share of loans in danger by roughly 0.6% if compared to a dynamic benchmark and 4.3% in the static benchmark. The latter number is reduced to 3.4% when our fiscally neutral instrument is used. The findings are robust to the data set (we used household budget survey for 2007 and 2008) and seem statistically sound.
There is one important issue we did not cover in the model. In both surveys, relatively large share of households would have been classified as delinquent in our study, which is at odds with the volume of non-performing loans reported by the banks. We seek the roots of this contradiction in the fact that many of the young debtors may benefit from the support of their families. Alternatively, some underreported revenues may matter for the liquidity of the households. We check the reliability of the reported data by comparing the estimated income gap defined as "barely sufficient" and our measure of the revenue gap. Although these values are fairly consistent, we can never be sure if reported incomes are indeed in line with reality. None of these issues can be tackled, however, using household survey data and thus remain fruitful avenues for future research.
